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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CARL STANLEY FLEMING, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040570-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from his convictions for one count each of aggravated robbery and 
aggravated kidnapping, both first degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 and § 78-3a-3(2)(j) (West 2004) (pour-over 
provisions). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Was defendant's trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for 
affirmatively approving jury instructions that correctly set forth the statutory and charged 
elements of aggravated kidnapping? 
Standard of Review: Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time 
on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, f 13,55 P.3d 1131. 
Issue No. 2: Has defendant met his burden of proving his counsel's ineffectiveness 
at trial where defendant has not adequately briefed his claims of ineffectiveness and where 
his claims depend almost entirely on a mischaracterization of the record? 
Standard of Review: Appellant "bears the burden of establishing that his trial counsel 
was ineffective." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 8, 12 P.3d 92. As stated, ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims raised for the first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. 
Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, \ 13. 
Issue No. 3: Was defendant's trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for not asking 
the trial court to merge his aggravated robbery and aggravated kidnapping convictions where 
the detention was not slight, inconsequential, or merely incidental to the aggravated robbery? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review is the same as that for Issue No. 1. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are reproduced in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 2004) (aggravated kidnapping); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (West 2004) (kidnapping); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (West 2004) (unlawful detention); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004) (aggravated robbery); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004 (robbery). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated robbery, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), and one count of aggravated kidnapping, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 2004), all first degree felonies. R4-5. After a 
2 
preliminary hearing, one count of aggravated robbery was dismissed and defendant was 
bound over on the remaining counts. R37; Rl51:40-41. 
The prosecutor submitted several proposed jury instructions before trial, including 
elements and definitions instructions. R65-85. Before jury voir dire, defense counsel told 
the trial court that he had reviewed the State's proposed instructions, found them "to be 
appropriate," and had no "problem with them." R152:5. Consequently, the trial court gave 
all of the prosecutor's proposed instructions as submitted. Compare R65-85 with R95-122. 
The jury convicted defendant as charged. R124; R165. 
The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of five years to life for 
aggravated robbery and ten years to life for aggravated kidnapping. Rl30-32. Defendant 
filed a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. R136. The supreme court 
transferred the appeal to this Court. R147. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Stephen Porter was filling his car with gas when defendant, a stranger, begged him 
foraride. Rl 52:70,74-75. Porter reluctantly agreed. Rl 52:74-75. Defendant thanked him 
by holding a blade to his throat, threatening to kill him, and stealing his watch, CD player, 
debit card, and PIN number. Rl 52:78-80, 84. Defendant then forced Porter to accompany 
defendant's brief recites the evidence in the light most favorable to his version of 
events. In keeping with well-established appellate practice, this brief will recite the facts 
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 2, 520 
Utah Adv. Rep. 27; State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, If 2, 6 P.3d 1116; State v. Gordon, 913 
P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996). 
3 
him to three different ATM's while defendant and his friend withdrew as much money from 
Porter's account as his limit would allow. Rl 52:84-90. 
"He continued to pester me and pester me and pester me...." 
Porter, a 23-year-old senior at BYU, tried to visit his parents in West Valley City at 
least two or three times a month. Rl 52:70, 95. At about 9:00 p.m., on Friday, November 7, 
2003, Porter left Provo in his two-door Toyota Tercel for one of those visits. Rl 52:70-72. 
Porter's parents lived near 3500 South. Rl 52:94. Thus, one route to their home from 
Provo was to take the 3300 South exit from 1-15 and travel west. Eventually, 3300 South 
jogs and turns into 3500 South. Id. But that route has several stoplights, so that Porter 
preferred to take 1-15 to Highway 201 (about 2100 South), where he would head west until 
he reached 5600 West. From there Porter would turn south to 3500 South. R152:71, 94, 
110. Although longer, Porter's preferred route was "a little faster" because Highway 201 has 
no stoplights and its speed limit is higher than that of 3300 South. Id. 
As Porter neared the Highway 201 junction on November 7, he noticed that he was 
almost out of gas. Rl 52:72. Porter believed that the nearest gas station to the west was on 
Redwood Road. Id. Porter, however, knew of a gas station on 1300 South and State Street 
called Wayne's Corner. Porter's sister used to work across the street from Wayne's Corner 
and Porter had bought gas there before. Id. Thinking that Wayne's Corner was closer than 
Redwood Road, Porter exited 1-15 onto 1300 South and traveled east towards State Street. 
R152:72-73. On the way to Wayne's Comer, Porter passed a 7-Eleven and a Maverick gas 
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station. Rl 52:72-73,96. Porter did not stop at either station because a mechanic friend had 
told him that their gas contained an additive that would ruin his engine. Rl 52:72-73. 
At Wayne's Comer, Porter used his debit card to pre-pay for his gas. Rl 52:75. Porter 
did not have any cash on him, nor did he like to carry a lot of cash because it made his 
"wallet a little bulgy." Rl 52:75-76. As Porter pumped gas, defendant approached him and 
asked for a ride. Rl52:74. Porter, who had never seen defendant before, initially "tried to 
blow him off by telling him [that Porter] was meeting some friends." Rl52:70, 75, 98. 
When that "didn't work," Porter told defendant that one of his friends "was in the hospital, 
so [Porter] needed to go to the hospital." Rl52:75. But defendant persisted, saying that he 
also needed to go to the hospital. Id. As proof, defendant showed Porter a bruise on his 
knuckle. Id. When defendant continued "to pester me and pester me and pester me," Porter 
relented and agreed to give him a ride. Id. 
Defendant followed Porter into the gas station store while Porter bought mints with 
his debit card. Rl52:76. The two then got into Porter's car and drove off. Rl52:77. 
Defendant told Porter that he needed to first stop by his parents' home to let them know 
where he was going. Id. Defendant told Porter to go south on State Street. Rl52:77-78. 
Defendant asked if he could smoke in Porter's car. Rl 52:88. Porter, a non-smoker, said 
"no" because he did not like the smell of cigarette smoke and did not want it in his car.2 Id. 
2Defendant makes much of Porter's testimony that defendant had asked permission 
to smoke in his car, calling it "peculiarly polite behavior coming from a purported 
aggravated kidnapper and robber." Br. Aplt. 5, 19, 29. In fact, there was nothing peculiar 
about this behavior because at this point defendant had not yet robbed and kidnapped 
Porter. Rather, as seen below, defendant was waiting until he could lull Porter into a 
5 
Defendant then asked Porter if he "ever did drugs." Rl52:89. When Porter said "no/5 
defendant refused to believe him. Id. Defendant confided that he was at that moment on 
methamphetamine. Id. 
"Give me all your money or I will kill you." 
Defendant ultimately directed Porter to a house on a dead-end street behind the 
Franklin-Covey baseball field. Rl 52:78. Defendant asked Porter "to kill the engine because 
he didn't want to wake his parents up." Id. When Porter obeyed, defendant reached into his 
coat pocket and pulled out "a blade of some sort." Id. Holding the blade in his right hand, 
defendant reached across Porter and held it against the left side of Porter's neck. Rl 52:98. 
Porter could not see the blade, but he "sure felt it." Id. Porter thought it felt like a "razor or 
a box-cutting knife." R152:99-100. 
Defendant told Porter to "[g]ive me all your money or I will kill you." Rl52:79. 
Porter gave defendant his wallet. Although the wallet contained no money, it held Porter's 
debit card. Id. Defendant took the card, looked at it, and asked what he could do with it. 
Id. Porter explained that defendant "could buy whatever he wanted with it." Id. Unsatisfied, 
defendant demanded something else. Id. Terrified, Porter handed defendant his watch, his 
CD player, and a book of CD's. Rl52:80. Each time Porter handed defendant an item, 
defendant threatened "there better be something else, or else." Id. 
After taking all of Porter's belongings, defendant put the blade away, but ordered 
Porter to drive to a friend's house, a few blocks south. Rl52:80-81. Defendant told Porter 
secluded area where he could safely rob him. 
6 
that if he "tried to escape or tried to run away he would kill [him].'5 R152:80. When they 
reached the friend's home, defendant ordered Porter out of the car and they both walked to 
the door. Rl52:81. Defendant warned Porter "once again that if [he] ran or anything 
[defendant] had a gun and . . . would kill" him. Id. 
Defendant's friend was not at home. Rl 52:81-82. As the two walked back to the car, 
defendant took Porter's car keys. Rl 52:82. Defendant got into the driver's seat while Porter 
got into the front passenger's seat. Id. Porter did not try to escape because he "felt [his] life 
was in danger." Id. Defendant had "told [Porter] he had a gun, and there was nothing to 
dispute that." Id. And Porter had seen "the look in [defendant's] eyes when he held the 
blade against [Porter's] throat." Porter was convinced that defendant "would not have 
hesitated to use it." Id. 
"Ifelt that if I didn 't cooperate with him fully, I would be dead." 
Defendant then drove to an apartment complex across the street from Wayne's Corner. 
Rl 52:83. Defendant pulled into the parking lot, "stuck his head out the window and called 
for another friend of his." Id. A woman, Sharon Thomas, yelled back and came downstairs. 
R152:83,114-15. Defendant had Porter get into the back seat, while Thomas took his place 
in the front. R152:83. 
Although Porter could have run at this point, he "felt like he had no place to run." 
Rl52:84. Porter believed defendant "still had a gun" and that if Porter "tried to move 
[defendant] would kill [him]." Id. Porter did not "feel safe going back to Wayne's Corner, 
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because that's where [he] first met [defendant]." Id. Also, by then it was around 10:00 p.m. 
and all the nearby businesses "looked closed." Id. 
Once Thomas was in the car, defendant held up Porter's card and announced he had 
a credit card. R152:116. Defendant wanted Thomas to use it to buy him cigarettes "or 
charge something." Id. When Thomas pointed out that the card was "a cash card," defendant 
told her that it belonged to Porter. Rl52:117. Thomas asked, "If it is his card, why didn't 
he use it?" Defendant replied, "I don't want him to." 
Thomas asked Porter if the card was his. Rl 52:117. When Porter said "yes," Thomas 
asked, "Well, are you giving me permission to use it?" Id. Porter replied, "Yes." R152:117, 
126. Thomas then asked for his PIN number. R152:117. Porter gave it to her because he 
"didn't feel like [he] had a choice." Rl 52:85. Porter "felt that if [he] didn't cooperate with 
[defendant] fully, [Porter] would be dead." Id. 
Defendant drives Porter to three different ATM}s 
Defendant drove Porter and Thomas to a 7-Eleven on about 500 East and 1300 South. 
Rl 52:85. Thomas went in to use the ATM while defendant and Porter waited in the car. Id. 
Defendant threatened that if Porter made "eye contact with anybody or if [Porter did] 
anything stupid, that [defendant] would kill [Porter]." Id. Porter promised to "be cool." Id. 
But after waiting about five minutes for Thomas, defendant began "getting nervous." 
R152:85-86. Noticing this, Porter suggested that they go inside. R152:86. Porter hoped that 
he could "make eye contact or signal someone." Id. Defendant agreed, but before the two 
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went inside he "reminded [Porter] that he had the gun5 and he told [Porter] that if [he] tried 
anything stupid, he would kill [him]." Id. 
Defendant entered the 7-Eleven first, with Porter closely following him. R152:105, 
143.44. Porter tried to catch someone's eye, but "[n]o one would look at [him]." R152:87. 
Thomas joined them and the three left the store, with Thomas leaving first, then defendant, 
and lastly Porter. Id. They all got back into the car in the same positions as before. Id. 
Thomas had made two $60.00 withdrawals from the ATM. Defense Exhibits 1, 2, 3. 
Defendant then drove to a drive-through ATM at a Wells Fargo Bank on 300 South. 
R152:89, 121; Defense Ex. 4. Thomas asked Porter for his PIN number again because she 
"kept forgetting it." R152:117. Thomas then got out of the passenger door and walked 
around to the ATM where she withdrew $200.00 from Porter's account. Rl 52:118; Defense 
Ex.4. 
When Thomas returned to the car, she and defendant "seemed a little confused." 
Rl 52:89. Neither of them knew where another 7-Eleven or gas station was, "so [they] drove 
around a little bit and eventually stumbled" onto a 7-Eleven at 1300 East and 200 South. Id; 
Defense Ex. 5, 6, 7. Thomas again went in alone while defendant and Porter waited in the 
car. R152:89-90. Thomas withdrew another $200.00. Defense Ex. 5. Thomas returned to 
the car. Rl52:90. Angry that Thomas had not withdrawn more money, defendant sent her 
back into the store to get more. Id. 
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Thomas tried to withdraw an additional $400.00, but that request was denied because 
Porter's limit of $500.00 had been reached. R152:90; Defense Ex. 6. Thomas then tried to 
withdraw another $ 100.00? but that request was also denied. Defense Ex. 7. 
When Thomas returned to the car, she told defendant that the ATM would not let her 
withdraw any more money. R152:119. She and defendant then divided the money between 
them. R152:90-91. Thomas asked Porter if he was "OK," R152:120. Before Porter could 
answer, defendant told him, "Don't fucking talk to her " Id. Angry, Thomas told Porter, 
"Let me the hell out." Id. Defendant dropped Thomas off at about South Temple and 700 
East. R152:120-21. Porter moved up to the front passenger seat. R152:91. 
Defendant then drove Porter along North Temple to the State Fairgrounds. Id. On 
the way, Porter saw a police car on their right side. Id. Porter noted that the officer "watched 
[him] very closely when they passed him." Id. Defendant warned Porter "especially if I tried 
to get their attention he would kill me." Id. 
Defendant stopped the car on a side street near the fairgrounds where he "pause[d] a 
little bit" and "wipe[d] his fingerprints off the steering wheel." R152:92. Defendant then 
told Porter that if he told "anyone what happened, he would kill [Porter]." Id. 
Porter drove directly to his parents' home because his "feeling of security had just 
been completely ripped from [him]. [He] felt vulnerable, [he] felt weak, [he] felt alone." 
Rl 52:93. Porter did not drive to a police station because he did not know where one was. 
Rl 52:92. He also did not stop to call police from a pay phone because he had no money. Id. 
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After Porter returned home, he discovered a small clear, plastic tube or vial wedged 
in the driver's seat, between the back and the seat. R152:101,108-09. Porter recalled that 
during the robbery and kidnapping, defendant had handed this vial to Porter to hold. 
Rl 52:101. Defendant told Porter that the tube contained methamphetamine. Id. Porter had 
tried to hold the vial on the edges so that he would not get his fingerprints on it. R152:110. 
Porter had hoped that doing so would also preserve defendant's fingerprints. Id. 
Porter's parents arrived home soon after he got there. Rl 52:93. After they talked and 
hugged, Porter called the police and reported the robbery and kidnapping. Id. At that time, 
Porter told police about the vial he found in his car. R152:108. At the officer's request, 
Porter later took the vial to the police station. R152:108-09. The police, however, did not 
test the contents of the vial, nor did they check it for fingerprints, because they saw no 
evidentiary value in doing so. R152:145. 
The defense 
In his opening statement, defense counsel asserted that Porter was not robbed, but was 
only getting even for a fraudulent drug deal. Rl 52:64-68. Counsel explained that defendant 
was a drug dealer who offered to sell Porter some methamphetamine. Rl 52:64-65. Counsel 
claimed that since Porter did not have any cash, he, defendant, and Thomas went to several 
different locations where they withdrew cash in order to pay for the drugs. Rl52:65-67. 
Defense counsel claimed that Porter waited to call police until after he got home because it 
was only then that he discovered that defendant had sold him rock salt instead of 
methamphetamine. Rl 52:67. Defense counsel also asserted in opening that Porter never 
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described a knife or blade of any sort to police. Id. Defense counsel explained that when 
defendant was apprehended over two months later, police found "a little tool in his pocket" 
that included "a small knife blade." Id. Counsel suggested that when police described this 
"little fold-out tool" to Porter, he adopted that description as the blade that defendant held 
to his neck. Rl52:67-68. 
To support his theory of the case, defense counsel elicited from Porter on cross-
examination that Porter had taken a longer route to his home and passed several gas stations 
before reaching Wayne's Corner. Rl52:94-97. Defense counsel elicited from Thomas on 
cross-examination that she had never seen defendant display a knife or gun and that she never 
heard defendant threaten Porter. R152:125-26. Counsel also elicited from Thomas, a drug 
addict, that she knew that drug deals were regularly conducted at Wayne's Comer. 
R152:123. Thomas also testified on cross that although she did not know if defendant was 
an "actual drug dealer," she had seen him sell drugs to people in the past. Id. 
In addition to building his case on cross-examination, defense counsel called 
Detective Todd Mitchell. R152:131,149. Detective Mitchell testified on direct that Porter 
described the blade that defendant had used "as a metallic-colored, switchblade-shaped 
object." R152:134. When defendant was arrested, about two-and-one-half months after the 
robbery, defendant had on him a small "tool or knife, gadget." R152:132-33. Detective 
Mitchell believed that this small "tool" was "close" to the blade that Porter had described to 
him. Rl 52:134-3 5. A photo of the small tool found on defendant—Defense Exhibit 9—was 
received into evidence over the State's relevance objection. R152:135; see Addendum C. 
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The State argued that the small tool was irrelevant because it had been seized two and a half 
months after the incident. R152:133, 135. Defense counsel contended that it was relevant 
because it contradicted Porter's testimony that he had never seen a knife and showed that 
Porter had simply adopted the detective's description of a blade found on defendant. 
R152:135. Defense counsel explained that he was "not suggesting that [the tool] was 
actually used. But it goes to impeachment of statement of witnesses in the case." Id. Based 
on that explanation, the trial court received Defense Exhibit No. 9 into evidence. Id. 
Detective Mitchell also testified on direct that he had obtained bank records showing 
the withdrawals from Porter's bank account that night. R152:135-36. See Defense Exhibits 
1-7. None of those records showed Porter's claimed purchase of gas and mints at Wayne's 
Corner. R152:139. When questioned about this, Detective Mitchell said that he must have 
only requested the records for the ATM withdrawals, although he did not specifically recall 
doing so. R152:139-40. 
After defendant's closing argument, but before the State's rebuttal, the trial court 
rescinded its earlier admission of the photo of the "small tool" found on defendant. 
R152:162. The trial judge explained to the jury that she was sustaining the State's earlier 
relevance objection because "there is no evidence, credible or otherwise, presented, 
establishing that the item depicted in Defense Exhibit 9 was the item that was used, that was, 
in fact, even present on the date in question, which is November 7." Id. The court 
continued, "This item was found on the person of the defendant at the time that he was, I 
assume, arrested, taken into custody in connection with the charges, well over two months 
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later." Id. Defense counsel then stated that he assumed that the court, by its statement, was 
"not making any conclusion whether any item, in fact, was used." Id. The trial court agreed, 
explaining that "there is no evidence that this item was anywhere near the events and acts in 
question on the day we are talking about." Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping with the intent "to 
facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted 
commission of a felony." The elements instruction properly listed only the charged intent. 
Instruction No. 20, however, defined aggravated kidnapping according to the statute and 
listed not only the charged intent of facilitating the commission of a felony, but also two 
other statutory intents. Defendant asserts that this latter instruction might have confused the 
jury into believing that it could also convict defendant if it found that he acted with an 
uncharged intent. This, defendant asserts, may have violated his right to a unanimous verdict 
and to a preliminary hearing on the convicted offense. 
Because defense counsel affirmatively approved the challenged instruction below, it 
may be reviewed only under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant has not 
demonstrated either that his counsel performed objectively unreasonably in approving the 
instruction or that any alleged deficiency prejudiced him. First, the instructions, when read 
as a whole, would not have led the jury to believe that it could convict defendant based on 
one of the unpled and unargued theories. Second, it is apparent that the jury was unanimous 
as to the charged theory of aggravated kidnapping because the jury unanimously found that 
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defendant was also guilty of aggravated robbery. Once the jury unanimously convicted 
defendant of aggravated robbery, it necessarily found that defendant had detained the victim 
for the purpose of facilitating a felony. 
Point II: Defendant identifies six instances in which he claims his trial counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective. This Court should decline to reach these claims because 
defendant has not adequately briefed them. This Court should also decline to reach them 
because they are based almost entirely on a mischaracterization of record facts. 
Point III: Defendant asserts that his counsel was ineffective for not moving to merge 
his aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery convictions. Under the facts of this case, 
however, the detention was neither slight, inconsequential, nor merely incidental to the 
aggravated robbery. To the contrary, the detention had significance independent of the 
aggravated robbery. Counsel, therefore, was not ineffective for not moving to merge the two 
convictions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE 
FOR AFFIRMATIVELY APPROVING JURY INSTRUCTIONS THAT 
CORRECTLY SET FORTH THE STATUTORY AND CHARGED 
ELEMENTS OF AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING 
Introduction 
A person commits aggravated kidnapping if, in the course of committing unlawful 
detention or kidnapping, he "possesses, uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon" or he 
15 
"acts with intent" in one of six enumerated circumstances. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(1) 
(West 2004). In this case, defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping because he 
intentionally and unlawfully detained Porter against his will with the intent "to facilitate the 
commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission of 
a felony." R5; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(l)(b)(ii) (West 2004). 
Jury Instruction No. 20 generally defined the crime of aggravated kidnapping by 
listing the charged intent and two others included in the statute: 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person commits Aggravated Kidnapping 
if that person intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law and against 
the will of the victim, by any means and in any manner seizes, confines, 
detains, or transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or to compel a third 
person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from engaging in 
particular conduct; or 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another. 
R117. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302(l)(b) (West 2004). However, the elements 
instruction—No. 24— instructed the jury only on the intent charged in the information: 
Before you can convict the defendant . . . of the offense of Aggravated 
Kidnapping . . . you must find from all the evidence and beyond a reasonable 
doubt each and every one of the following elements of the offense: 
4. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or transportation was committed 
with the intent to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight 
after commission or attempted commission of a felony. 
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R121. The jury was instructed that robbery is a felony. R122. (Relevant jury instructions 
are attached in Addendum B). 
Defendant concedes that the elements instruction correctly instructed on only the 
charged theory of aggravated kidnapping—that he acted with the intent to facilitate the 
commission, attempted commission, or flight from the commission of a felony. Br. Aplt. 11-
12. He argues, however, that the jury may have been misled by Instruction 20 into believing 
that they could also convict defendant if they found that he acted with the intent "to hold for 
ransom or reward/' or with the intent "to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or 
another." Br. Aplt. 12-13. Defendant asserts that this may have violated his right to a 
unanimous verdict because although "the jurors were instructed that they each had to agree 
with each verdict, they were not instructed that they had to reach a unanimous verdict on one 
factual theory underlying the aggravated kidnapping conviction." Id Defendant contends 
that there is no way to know "which theory the jury chose as the basis for that conviction," 
because the verdict form was a general one. Br. Aplt. 13. 
Defendant alternatively argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the aggravated 
kidnapping charge because the jury was "given the option[] of convicting [him] on the basis 
of two factual theories that were never pled or bound over." Br. Aplt. 13. Defendant asserts 
that this violated his state constitutional right "to a preliminary hearing on the offense of 
conviction." Br. Aplt. 13-14. Defendant further contends that this deprived him of a fair 
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trial because he had no notice that he was accused under the two other aggravated kidnapping 
theories and therefore could not defend against them.3 Id. 
Because defendant's trial counsel affirmatively approved the challenged instruction, 
defendant may obtain appellate review of this issue only under a claim that his counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective. As explained below, defendant has not demonstrated that his 
counsel acted objectively unreasonably in approving the instruction. More important, as 
explained below, defendant cannot show prejudice because the jury unanimously found that 
3Defendant does not challenge the technical correctness of either Instruction No. 
20 or Instruction No. 24. It should be noted, however, that both instructions use language 
from a prior version of the aggravated kidnapping statute. Before 2001, a person 
committed aggravated kidnapping if he "by any means and in any manner, seize[d], 
confine[d], detain[ed], or transported] the victim" with one of the specified intents, 
including the intent to facilitate the commission of a felony. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 
(1999). The former statute did not require that any detention last for a certain period of 
time. Effective April 30, 2001, the aggravated kidnapping statute was amended to simply 
provide that one commits aggravated kidnapping if he, "in the course of committing 
unlawful detention or kidnapping," acts with one of the specified statutory intents, 
including the intent to facilitate the commission of a felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
302 (West 2004); 2001 Utah Laws ch. 301, § 4. A person commits unlawful detention if 
he "detains or restrains the victim under circumstances not constituting a violation of 
[kidnapping, child kidnapping, or aggravated kidnapping]." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 
(West 2004). A person commits kidnapping, inter alia, if he "detains or restrains the 
victim for any substantial period of time." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301(1) (West 2004). 
Although simple kidnapping requires the detention to last for a substantial period time, 
unlawful detention does not have any time element. Thus, the current aggravated 
kidnapping statute still does not require a detention for any set period of time. 
Consequently, even though the instructions here used the former statutory language, the 
jury was correctly instructed on all the elements it needed to find under the current statute. 
Moreover, as explained, defense counsel affirmatively approved the instructions as 
given. On appeal, defendant does not claim that either Instruction No. 20 or Instruction 
No. 24 are incorrect for using the prior statutory language nor does he claim that this 
created any confusion with the jury. Rather, he focuses only on whether the jury 
unanimously found that he acted with the intent to facilitate a felony. The State, 
therefore, will address only that issue. 
18 
he committed aggravated robbery during the commission of the kidnapping. Thus, the jury 
necessarily unanimously found that defendant kidnapped Porter with the charged intent of 
facilitating the commission of a felony—robbery. Accordingly, neither defendant's right to 
a unanimous verdict nor to a preliminary hearing on the convicted offense was violated. 
A. Because defense counsel affirmatively approved the challenged instruction, 
defendant may obtain appellate review of this issue only under a claim that his 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 
Instruction No. 20—the jury instruction defendant challenges—was one of many 
proposed by the prosecution before trial. See R65-85; R152:5. Just before jury voir dire, the 
prosecutor announced that she had submitted proposed jury instructions. Defense counsel 
immediately stated: "And I have looked at the State's instructions, and I find them to be 
appropriate. I don't have any problem with them. I don't have any particular instructions 
that I intend to offer." R152:5. Consequently, the trial court gave all the prosecutor's 
proposed instructions, including No. 20. Compare R69-85 with Rl 13-22. 
Defendant acknowledges that his trial attorney did not object to any of the jury 
instructions and that, indeed, he "informed the court that he had reviewed the instructions and 
found them to be appropriate." Br. Aplt. 16 (citing Rl 52:5). Defendant nevertheless asserts 
that this Court may, and should, review this claim "under the extraordinary circumstances, 
plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines." Id 
Appellate review under plain error, however, is not available when, as here, 
defendant himself invites the alleged error. Rule 19(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides that "[u]nless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, 
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the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." A claim 
of manifest injustice under rule 19(e) is generally reviewed under "the same standard that is 
applied to determine whether plain error exists " State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221,1226 
(Utah 1998). See also State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, \ 40, 82 P.3d 1106. 
The Utah Supreme Court, however, has consistently held that a defendant may not 
obtain plain error or manifest injustice review of an alleged instructional error when 
"counsel, either by statement or act affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had 
no objection to the jury instruction." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54, 70 P.3d 111. 
Accord State v. Pinder, 2005 UT 15, ^ J 62, 520 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 (defendant could not 
obtain appellate review of alleged erroneous jury instruction because he stipulated to the 
instruction); State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ 9, 86 P.3d 742 (denying appellate review 
of jury instruction offered by defendant); State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1108-09 (Utah 
1996) (defendant invited error when he failed to object to instruction when specifically 
queried by the court); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (defendant invited 
error when his counsel actively represented to the trial court that she had read instruction and 
had no objection to it). 
Defense counsel here affirmatively represented to the trial court that he had no 
objection to the challenged instruction when he stated that he had read the prosecutor's 
proposed instructions and that he believed they were all "appropriate." R152:5. Because 
defendant invited any error, he is not entitled to plain error review of the challenged 
instruction. See Pinder, 2005 UT 15, f 61 ("we have consistently declined to review 
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allegations of jury instruction error, even under the manifest injustice standard, when the 
error complained of was invited'5). 
Nor may defendant obtain appellate review under the exceptional circumstances 
doctrine. This exception to the preservation rule is "'ill-defined and applies primarily to rare 
procedural anomalies.'" State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 12, 10 P.3d 346 (quoting State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1209, n.3 (Utah 1993)). The exceptional circumstances doctrine has 
been applied "sparingly" and has been reserved "for the most unusual circumstances where 
[the] failure to consider an issue that was not properly preserved for appeal would have 
resulted in manifest injustice." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
A finding of exceptional circumstances, however, "requires something much more 
exceptional than mere oversight by trial counsel " State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah 
App. 1996) (citing State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 333 & n.l (Utah 1993)). This is because 
such facts give rise to a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, another well-
recognized exception to the preservation rule. Id. As this Court has explained, if the 
exceptional circumstances concept applied in such cases, "we would have to employ it in 
every case where there might have been ineffective assistance at trial which is not raised on 
appeal." Id This would sanction "use of the exceptional circumstances concept as a way 
to address problems caused by ineffective assistance of counsel, but without requiring 
appellant to prove up such a claim on appeal in accordance with his or her burden under the 
Sixth Amendment, as elucidated in Strickland v. Washington and its progeny." Id. (citations 
omitted). Moreover, to hold otherwise would foster "invited error." See State v. Litherland, 
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2000 UT 763 f 31, 12 P.3d 92 (refusing "to give defendants the benefit of traditional plain 
error analysis where doing so would create an incentive for invited error5'); State v. Brown, 
948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (refusing to review a claim where trial counsel consciously 
chose not to object because to do otherwise "would be sanctioning a procedure that fosters 
invited error"). 
In sum, having affirmatively approved the challenged instruction, the only reviewable 
claim defendant now has is that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective when he 
affirmatively approved the proposed jury instructions. 
B. Defendant has not demonstrated that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective 
in approving the challenged instruction. 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate 
both that "counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment," and that "counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case/' State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
Tfl9 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984)). 
With respect to the first Strickland prong, an appellate court "must 'indulge in the 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that under the 
circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'" State v. 
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998) {quoting State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 
(Utah App. 1993) and Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065) (internal quotation 
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marks omitted). If a court can find a conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions, then 
counsel has not performed deficiently under the first Strickland'prong. See State v. Holbert, 
2002UTApp426458,61P3d291;*eea^ 
(holding that first prong of Strickland was not satisfied because it was conceivable that 
counsel's conduct was result of deliberate and tactical choice). 
With respect to the second Strickland prong, defendant must show that absent 
counsel's acts or omissions, there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. State 
v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (quotations and citations omitted). Such a showing 
must be based on a "demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter." Id. 
Thus, to prevail on his claim, defendant must show that his counsel's approval of 
Instruction No. 20 "fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment" 
and that absent this alleged deficient performance there was "a reasonable probability of a 
more favorable result." As explained below, defendant has not demonstrated either 
Strickland prong. 
1. Defendant has not demonstrated that his counsel performed objectively 
unreasonably by approving the proposed jury instructions. 
Defendant's argument that his trial counsel performed deficiently consists of four 
sentences. Br. Aplt. 17-18. He begins with, "One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer 
is to properly raise and preserve all issues in the lower court." Br. Aplt. 17. He then asserts 
that "[t]rial counsel's failure to object to the erroneous jury instructions and verdict was 
objectively deficient" because "[j]ury instructions are routinely prepared well in advance of 
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the trial, and there is no need for this Court to defer to decisions made regarding instructions, 
because these decisions should not be made in the heat of battle." Id. at 17-18. He concludes 
with, "Permitting Mr. Fleming to be convicted of the very serious offense of aggravated 
kidnapping on the basis of confusing jury instructions £ind with a non-unanimous verdict 
form simply does not coalesce into any reasonable trial strategy." Id. at 18. 
Defendant's conclusory argument does not demonstrate that his counsel's approval 
of the prosecutor's proposed jury instructions was objectively unreasonable. As a threshold 
matter, defendant's argument incorrectly assumes that lack of a conceivable tactical basis 
establishes deficient performance per se. Under Strickland, however, "the proper standard 
of attorney performance is reasonably effective assistance" under "prevailing professional 
norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The Strickland'test asks "whether counsel's assistance 
was reasonable considering all the circumstances," not whether there is a conceivable tactical 
basis for counsel's conduct. Id. at 688. 
While it is true that the existence of a conceivable tactical basis demonstrates that 
counsel acted reasonably, it does not necessarily follow that lack of a conceivable tactical 
basis means that counsel's conduct was objectively unreasonable. Rather, ";[t]he relevant 
question is not whether counsel's choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable.'" 
Bullockv. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036,1041 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotingRoe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 
U.S. 470, 480 (2000)), cert denied by 537 U.S. 1093 (2002). Thus, counsel may make 
mistakes for which there is no strategic explanation, so long as his conduct is objectively 
reasonable in light of all the circumstances. Id. at 1047-51. 
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Here, trial counsel acted objectively reasonably under all the circumstances because 
he had no reason to object to Instruction No. 20 or to the lack of a special verdict form. As 
defendant has conceded, the elements instruction correctly instructed the jury on only the 
charged intent of aggravated kidnapping—facilitating the commission of a felony. 
Instruction No. 20 also correctly stated that aggravated kidnapping could be committed with 
various intents, including the charged intent. Defendant's only complaint is that Instruction 
No. 20 might have confused the jury into thinking that it could convict him based on an 
uncharged intent. 
The intent with which defendant might have detained Porter, however, was irrelevant 
to the defense strategy. Defendant's defense was that he did not unlawfully detain Porter 
against his will. According to defendant's theory, Porter willingly went with defendant to 
get money so that he could buy drugs from defendant. R152:65-67,157-58,160. If the jury 
had believed defendant's version of events, it would have simply acquitted him without ever 
considering the intent element of aggravated kidnapping. Consequently, defense counsel had 
no reason to object to the instructions. 
It was therefore not objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to approve the 
instructions as written. 
2. Defendant has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
approval of the jury instructions as written. 
But even if trial counsel had performed deficiently, defendant cannot show that he was 
prejudiced. First, the instructions, when read as a whole, would not have led the jury to 
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believe that it could convict defendant based on one of the unpled and unargued theories 
listed in Instruction No. 20. Irrespective of what Instruction 20 said, the elements instruction 
informed the jury that it could convict defendant only if it first found "from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of that 
offense." R121 (emphasis added). As stated, one of the elements listed in that instruction 
was that defendant unlawfully detained Porter against his will with "the intent to facilitate 
the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission 
of a felony." R121. Thus, the elements instruction correctly and clearly informed the jury 
that it could convict defendant only if it first found that he had acted with the intent that had 
been charged in the information. Instruction No. 12 told the jury that its verdict had to be 
unanimous. Thus, even though Instruction 20 mentioned three possible intents, the jury was 
expressly instructed that it had to unanimously find the charged intent before it could convict 
defendant. 
Second, based on the elements instruction, the evidence, and the arguments before it, 
the jury clearly understood that it could convict defendant only if it found that he committed 
kidnapping with the intent to facilitate a felony. As stated, the elements instruction informed 
the jury that it had to find that element. Other instructions gave the jury three possible 
felonies to choose from: use of a financial transaction card without the consent of the owner, 
theft of over a $1000, and robbery. Rl 19, 120, 122. In closing argument, the prosecutor 
explained the elements of aggravated kidnapping. Based on the elements instruction, she 
argued that the jury had to find that the kidnapping "took place with the intent to facilitate 
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the commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or attempted commission 
of felony." Rl 52:153-54. The prosecutor then explained that defendant had committed three 
felonies: theft over a $ 1,000, use of a financial transaction card, and robbery. Rl 52:154-55. 
No one argued that the jury could find defendant guilty under the other intents mentioned in 
Instruction No. 20. Indeed, the evidence at trial supported only the charged theory. 
And finally, it is apparent in this case that the jury was unanimous as to the charged 
theory of aggravated kidnapping because the jury unanimously found defendant guilty of 
aggravated robbery. Once the jury unanimously convicted defendant of aggravated robbery, 
it necessarily found that defendant had detained Porter to facilitate a felony. 
This conclusion is compelled by the Utah Supreme Court's holding in State v. 
Germonto, 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993). Germonto was charged with murder. Id. at 57. The 
trial court instructed the jury on the four statutory variants of murder, but did not require jury 
unanimity on the particular variant relied on for conviction. Id. Like defendant does here, 
Germonto claimed that the trial court deprived him of the right to a unanimous jury verdict 
because it failed to instruct the jury that it had to be unanimous on the theory it convicted on. 
Id. at 57. 
The Utah Supreme Court had previously held that jury unanimity was not required 
when only the first three variants of murder—intentional or knowing, intending to cause 
serious bodily injury, and depraved indifference—were charged. Id. But the Court had never 
addressed whether unanimity was required when the fourth variant—felony murder—was 
also charged. Id. The Court found no occasion to address the issue in Germonto, however, 
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because the jury had also convicted Germonto of robbery, the predicate felony underlying 
the murder conviction. The Germonto court concluded that the "murder conviction was thus 
unanimous as a matter of law under the fourth variant," and "the fact that the evidence might 
also support a conviction under the other three variants is therefore ultimately irrelevant." 
Id. (citing State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Utah 1986) (holding that where jury was 
necessarily unanimous on one alternative aggravating circumstance for first degree murder, 
constitutional adequacy of another alternative need not be addressed)). 
Here, defendant was charged with aggravated kidnapping with the intent to facilitate 
the commission of a felony. The jury unanimously convicted defendant of committing 
aggravated robbery at the same time. The jury was instructed that robbery was a felony. The 
jury was therefore unanimous as a matter of law on the charged theory of aggravated 
kidnapping. Accordingly, defendant was denied neither his right to a unanimous jury verdict 
nor to a preliminary hearing on the offense of conviction. Defendant counsel's alleged 
deficient performance, therefore, could not have prejudiced defendant. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT MET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT 
HIS COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AT TRIAL 
WHERE HE HAS NOT ADEQUATELY BRIEFED HIS CLAIMS AND 
WHERE HIS CLAIMS REST ALMOST ENTIRELY ON A 
MISCHARACTERIZATION OF THE RECORD FACTS 
Defendant asserts that his counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by 
introducing harmful evidence and failing to recognize and assert helpful evidence. Br. Aplt. 
22-23. Defendant cites six instances of his counsel's alleged failures at trial. Id. 
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Defendant "bears the burden of establishing that his trial counsel was ineffective." 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 8, 12 P.3d 92. As explained in Point I, defendant must 
prove to this Court that his counsel performed objectively unreasonably and that counsel's 
alleged deficient performance prejudiced him. Defendant has not carried his burden. First, 
he does not adequately brief any of his six ineffectiveness claims. Second, his claims are 
based almost entirely on a mischaracterization of the record. 
A. Defendant has not met his burden under Strickland because he has not 
adequately briefed his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant's brief to set 
forth an argument that "contain[s] the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the 
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." It is 
not enough under this rule to superficially cite to authority; rather, the rule requires a 
"substantive examination" of the contention presented. State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2, fflf 11-
13,974 P.2d 269. Moreover, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined 
with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research." Id. at f 11 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). Accord State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 6, 1 P.3d 1108. "'It is well 
established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately 
briefed.'" State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, Tf 15,99 P.3d 820 (quoting State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 305 (Utah 1998)). 
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Although defendant sets forth the correct Strickland standard, he provides no legal 
authority or analysis specific to his six allegations of ineffectiveness. In the span of three 
pages he throws out his six allegations, but exerts no effort to explain how counsel's 
performance was objectively deficient in each instance. Indeed, none of defendant's 
individual ineffectiveness claims receives more than half a page. See Br. Aplt. 22-25. 
Nowhere does defendant acknowledge that his trial counsel may have had a reasonable 
strategic reason for his actions. Nor does he analyze each of his specific claims in the 
context of his attorney's whole trial strategy. Indeed, defendant fails to even acknowledge 
that his attorney had a cohesive trial strategy and that his attorney's acts and omissions all 
consistently supported that strategy. 
Defendant's claim of prejudice is equally lacking. Instead of explaining how each 
claimed deficiency prejudiced him, defendant merely asserts that "the State's case against 
him was far less than compelling." Br. Aplt. 28. He then recites the facts supporting his 
version of events and points out what he considers to be weaknesses in the victim's story. 
Br. Aplt. 28-31. Defendant then lists each of his counsel's claimed deficiencies and broadly 
concludes after each one that "there is reasonable probability of a different result" absent 
each failure. Br. Aplt. 30-31. Again, however, defendant fails to analyze his claim of 
prejudice in the context of all the evidence at trial and his attorney's whole trial strategy. 
In short, defendant has "dumpfed] the burden of argument and research" on both the 
Court and on the State. Given his failure to explain how his attorney performed objectively 
unreasonably in a way that adversely affected the outcome, defendant has not met his heavy 
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burden under Strickland. This alone is reason to reject these ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. 
B. Defendant's ineffectiveness claims are based on a mischaracterization of the 
record. 
This Court should also decline to address defendant's six ineffectiveness claims 
because they are based almost entirely on a mischaracterization of the record facts. In 
support of his claims, defendant has presented selective facts that support only his version 
of events, omitted important facts that show counsel acted reasonably, and then distorted the 
record to the point of misrepresentation. 
For example, defendant first faults his trial counsel for not pointing out the "bizarre 
nature of Porter's claim that [defendant], a supposed meth user, asked his supposed robbery 
and kidnapping victim to hold his vial of drugs during the course of the supposed kidnapping 
and robbery." Br. Aplt. 22. Defendant ignores, however, that it was defense counsel who, 
on cross-examination, elicited the information about the vial in the first place. R152:100, 
108-09. The information about the vial was important to defendant's theory that Porter 
reported him to police only to get revenge for a fraudulent drug deal. The existence of the 
vial and the fact that Porter had it with him when he reached his parents' home supported that 
theory. Thus, counsel had no need to point out "the bizarre nature" of Porter's claim 
regarding the vial. 
With respect to his second argument, defendant criticizes his counsel for not pointing 
out Porter's "unusual" claim that defendant "supposedly asked Porter's permission to smoke 
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a cigarette in his car." Br. Aplt. 22. But in closing argument, defense counsel did refer to 
this claim and used it to undercut the victim's credibility: "[Porter] claims that he is afraid 
of [defendant]. Well, he tells him he doesn't want him to smoke in his car. He is not afraid 
to tell him that." Rl 52:158. Defendant does not explain how calling this testimony "bizarre" 
would have aided his cause any more. 
Defendant's second claim also faults his counsel for not asking "Porter why he was 
searching his car [when he found the vial] before he called police to report the robbery." Br. 
Aplt. 22. Nothing in the record, however, suggests that Porter was "searching" his car before 
calling police. Porter merely testified on cross-examination that after he reached his parents' 
home, he found the vial in the driver's seat, "wedged between the two sides, the back and the 
seat." Rl 52:109. Given that Porter had just gotten out of the driver's seat, there is no reason 
to believe that he had to "search" his car in order to discover the vial. In any event, as 
explained, the defense theory was that Porter had willingly bought the vial from defendant. 
Suggesting that Porter had to search to find the vial would have undercut that theory. 
Defendant thirdly complains that his counsel did not "reiterate" Thompson's 
testimony that "she used Porter's card and personal identification number with his express 
permission." Br. Aplt. 22. Defendant ignores Porter's testimony that while he gave 
Thompson his PIN number and told her she could use the card, he did so only because he was 
afraid that defendant would harm him. Thus, while Thompson might have been able to use 
this testimony to justify and rationalize her actions, defendant could not have used it to 
justify his conduct because he knew that Porter's "permission" was coerced. Defendant also 
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omits that his counsel argued that Porter willingly allowed defendant and Thompson to use 
his debit card by emphasizing other factual points. For example, counsel argued in closing 
that Porter did not run away or seek help despite several opportunities to do so and that the 
surveillance tape showed Porter following defendant into the first 7-Eleven. Rl 52:159-60. 
"This/5 counsel argued "was not the act of someone being robbed." Rl 52:160. Emphasizing 
Thompson's testimony that Porter gave her permission to use the card was therefore 
unnecessary and would have added little to counsel's overall argument and strategy. 
Defendant also faults his attorney for not informing the jury that Thompson had 
received immunity in exchange for her testimony. Br. Aplt. 22. What defendant does not 
disclose is that defense counsel used Thompson's testimony to support his theory that 
defendant did not rob or kidnap Porter. On cross-examination, Thompson testified that she 
never heard defendant threaten Porter, or display a knife or a gun. Rl52:125-26. Indeed, 
Thompson had never seen defendant carry a gun. R152:126. Thompson also testified that 
she had seen defendant sell drugs and that she had frequently been to Wayne's Corner where 
"a significant amount of drug dealing goes on." R152:123. Defense counsel also elicited 
from Thompson that drug dealers generally accept only cash, thereby supporting defendant's 
theory that Porter willingly went with defendant to withdraw money from an ATM. 
Rl52:123-24. In short, although Thompson was called by the State, defense counsel 
substantially used her testimony to support his theory of the case. Accordingly, defense 
counsel may have reasonably decided that he did not want to zealously impeach Thompson's 
credibility. 
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Defendant next faults his attorney for introducing evidence that when defendant was 
arrested, he was carrying "a weapon with two blades." Br. Aplt. 23. The word "weapon" 
exaggerates the nature of the item found on defendant. Defense Exhibit 9 shows what trial 
counsel accurately described as a "a little tool in his pocket" or a "little fold-out tool" that 
included "a small knife blade." Rl52:67-68; see Addendum C. The two blades on this 
small "tool" were no more than 1 1/2 inches each. See Defense Ex. 9. Indeed, both blades 
look very much like what one might see on nail clippers or on a very small pocket knife. 
Defendant suggests that his attorney essentially corroborated the State's case when 
he introduced Defense Exhibit 9. Br. Aplt. 23-24. Again, defendant mischaracterizes the 
record by omitting that his attorney clearly explained that his reason for offering the exhibit 
was to impeach Porter's testimony. R152:135. Although Porter had disclaimed ever seeing 
the blade held to his neck, Detective Mitchell testified that Porter had described the blade "as 
a metallic-colored, switchblade-shaped object." Rl 52:134. Defense counsel tried to use the 
exhibit to establish that Porter was not credible because he had essentially adopted Mitchell's 
description of the small tool seized by police. R152:132-35. Indeed, counsel made clear that 
he was not suggesting that this "small tool" was actually used; he argued only that it went "to 
impeachment of statements of witnesses in the case." Rl 52:13 5. Consistent with that theory, 
defense counsel argued in closing: 
Porter claims that [defendant] threatened him with an X-ACTO type 
blade. Fact, Sharon Thompson never saw a blade or weapon of any kind. 
Fact, Porter himself never saw a blade or a weapon of any kind. Detective 
Mitchell claims that Porter describes this knife to him in some detail, giving 
dimensions, about two and a half inches by three quarters of an inch. Fact, this 
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particular tool that you have, I think it is one of the defendant's exhibits, a 
photograph of this tool, was taken from [defendant] two and a half months 
later. And Porter claims that he never described any dimensions. So 
somebody there, one of the two, has got their facts mixed up. 
R152-.158. Thus, the record clearly demonstrates that trial counsel had a carefully thought-
out strategic reason for admitting Defense Exhibit 9. That conscious decision was 
objectively reasonable. Moreover, defendant cannot show prejudice where the trial court 
ultimately excluded the exhibit and instructed the jury that no credible evidence showed that 
defendant had the "small tool" on the night of the offenses. Rl 52:162. See State v. Harmon, 
956 P.2d 262, 271-72 (Utah 1998) (jury generally presumed to have followed all judge's 
instructions, including curative ones).4 
Defendant next asserts that his trial court erred in introducing evidence that defendant 
tried to steal more than $1,000. Br. Aplt. 23. This fact was necessary to establish that theft 
and using a financial transaction card without the owner's permission were felonies. The 
jury was instructed that these two crimes, based on the amount defendant attempted to steal, 
were felonies (in addition to robbery) that could serve as a basis for finding that defendant 
kidnapped Porter with the intent to facilitate a felony. Rl 19-20, 122. Defendant, however, 
has not shown any harm where the jury found defendant guilty of another predicate felony 
for kidnapping—aggravated robbery. Given that the jury unanimously convicted defendant 
4It is also likely that trial counsel saw no downside to introducing Defense Exhibit 
9, given that the "small tool" was not at all threatening or dangerous looking. Anyone 
viewing that exhibit would be hard-pressed to conclude that this was a dangerous weapon. 
See Addendum C. Thus, it is highly unlikely that introduction of this error prejudiced 
defendant. 
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based on this theory, see Point I above, counsel's alleged deficient performance in this regard 
cannot have prejudiced defendant. 
Finally, defendant claims his attorney did not point out the discrepancies between 
Porter's testimony regarding the timing of the crimes and the times appearing on the ATM 
withdrawal records. Br. Aplt. 23-24. In fact, there were no significant time discrepancies 
to point out. Detective Mitchell explained that each ATM receipt showed two different time 
stamps. R152:147. Detective Mitchell then explained that he had no way of knowing 
whether any of the time stamps were correct. R152:147. More important, defendant does 
not explain how challenging the time frames was likely to have given him a more favorable 
outcome. Defendant never disputed the times alleged by Porter, nor did he dispute that he 
withdrew money from Porter's account through Thompson. Defendant only claimed that 
Porter had given them permission to use his card in order to pay for drugs. Challenging the 
time frames would not have advanced his theory. 
Defendant concludes his ineffectiveness claims by asserting that the "record of the 
instant case, as summarized in the statement of facts, supra, similarly demonstrates so many 
instances where trial counsel both failed to advocate [defendant's] position, and instead 
actually advocated the State's case, that the adversary system was not functioning as it should 
have, and that trial counsel's performance unfortunately is fairly characterized as obj ectively 
deficient." Br. Aplt. 25. As stated, however, defendant's statement of facts selectively 
presents the facts in the light most favorable to his claim. It ignores the extensive evidence 
that supported the State's theory and the jury's verdict. It also fails to acknowledge that trial 
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counsel here had a cohesive reasonable trial strategy. Indeed, defendant's own recitation of 
the facts demonstrates that counsel skillfully presented this theory to the jury. Each 
perceived inconsistency in the victim's story was in the record because trial counsel put it 
there. That counsel's strategy ultimately failed, however, does mean that it was objectively 
unreasonable. See State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 160 (Utah 1989) (the fact that counsel's 
choice of legitimate trial strategy "did not produce the expected result does not constitute 
ineffectiveness of counsel"). 
In sum, defendant's six cursory ineffectiveness claims do not carry his heavy burden 
of proving both objectively deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland. Indeed, 
defendant's claims of ineffectiveness amount to no more than the kind of hindsight second-
guessing that Strickland expressly prohibits. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. 
POINT III 
THE AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING CONVICTION WAS NOT 
SLIGHT, INCONSEQUENTIAL AND MERELY INCIDENTAL TO 
THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY CONVICTION; TRIAL COUNSEL 
THEREFORE WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT MOVING TO 
MERGE THE TWO CONVICTIONS 
Defendant finally argues that "the detention in this case was incidental to and inherent 
in the protracted robbery." Br. Aplt. 25. Thus, he contends, the aggravated kidnapping 
charge should be merged into the aggravated robbery charge. Id. Defendant acknowledges 
that this issue is unpreserved. Accordingly, he seeks review of this issue by claiming his trial 
counsel was ineffective for not moving to merge the two convictions. Id. Defendant's 
counsel was not ineffective, however, because under the facts of this case the detention was 
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not incidental to or inherent in the robbery. Rather, the facts supporting the aggravated 
kidnapping had significance independent of the aggravated robbery conviction. 
In State v. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10,117-19, 994 P.2d 1243, the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that one circumstance giving rise to a merger of two or more separate crimes may 
occur when a defendant is convicted of both a kidnapping and a crime in which a detention 
is inherent, such as a sexual assault or robbery.5 The Finlayson court explained that "[b]y 
definition, every rape and forcible sodomy is committed against the will of the victim and 
therefore involves a necessary detention, which is, of course, required by the kidnapping 
statutes. Thus, absent a clear distinction, virtually every rape and robbery would 
automatically be a kidnapping as well." Id. at ^  19. See also State v. Mechatn, 2000 UT App 
247, Tf 29,9 P.3d 777 (recognizing that detention, "while not an element, is inherent in most 
aggravated robberies"). 
To prevent punishing a defendant twice for the same act, Finlayson reaffirmed the 
principle first announced in State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89 (Utah 1981): "To sustain convictions 
5The other circumstance under which merger may occur is when a defendant is 
convicted of both greater and lesser included offenses. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ^ 11-15. 
This circumstance is governed by statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (West 2004), 
which "includes convictions on both an offense charged and a lesser included offense." 
Id. at ^ f 15. "Under this section, an offense is an included offense when '[i]t is established 
by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the 
offense charged.'" Id. Defendant does not contend that there is any issue of statutory 
merger here, nor could he. The definitions of aggravated kidnapping, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-302 (West 2004), and aggravated robbery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004) 
differ. (Copies of both statutes are contained in Addendum A). Specifically, aggravated 
robbery has no detention element and aggravated kidnapping has no taking of personal 
property element. 
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for both kidnapping and sexual assault [or robbery], the prosecutor must show that the 
kidnapping detention was longer than the necessary detention involved in the commission 
ofthe sexual assault [or robbery]." Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, j^ 19. TheFinlayson court found 
the following three-part test useful in determining whether a kidnapping detention exceeded 
that required by the host crime—in this case, aggravated robbery: 
"[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the 
commission of another crime, to be kidnaping the resulting movement or 
confinement: 
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other 
crime; 
(b) Must not be ofthe kind inherent in the nature ofthe other crime; and 
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it 
makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially 
lessens the risk of detection." 
Id at If 23 (quoting State v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720, 731 (Kan. 1976)). 
Applying the foregoing test to these facts, it is clear that the kidnapping in this case 
far exceeded any detention inherent in the crime of aggravated robbery. First, the facts 
supporting the kidnapping were not "slight, inconsequential and merely incidental" to the 
aggravated robbery. The detention here began with the aggravated robbery, when defendant 
first held a blade to Porter's throat and demanded money. Rl 52:98. The aggravated robbery 
was complete once Porter turned over his wallet, watch, CD player, and book of CD's.6 
6A person commits aggravated robbery "if in the course of committing robbery, he 
uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. A 
person commits robbery when he "unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, 
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Defendant, however, continued to detain Porter long after he had finished robbing him. After 
taking everything Porter had of value, defendant forced Porter to drive to a friend's home. 
He then forced Porter to accompany him to the door. Rl52:80-82. This detention was 
completely unrelated and unnecessary to the aggravated robbery. Defendant then drove 
Porter to another apartment complex where defendant picked up Thompson. Rl 52:83. This 
continued detention was also unrelated and unnecessary to the robbery. Defendant then 
detained Porter while he drove to three different ATM's, dropped Thompson off, and then 
drove to the State Fairgrounds where he finally released Porter. Rl 52:85-92. This lengthy 
continued detention was also unnecessary to the robbery, which by now had long since been 
completed. Defendant's detention of Porter, then, was not "slight, inconsequential and 
merely incidental" to the aggravated robbery. 
The detention was also not of "the kind inherent in the nature" of robbery. As stated, 
defendant completed the crime of aggravated robbery as soon as Porter had turned over his 
personal property. Forcing Porter to then accompany defendant to two friends' homes and 
to three different ATM's while the defendant's accomplice withdrew money is not the kind 
of detention that is inherent in the nature of robbery. "This was not a typical robbery where 
the victims' detention consists of them simply standing still for a few brief moments." State 
v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, *h 33, 9 P.3d 777. Rather, the detention was "an additional 
act, completely independent of the act of taking property by force or threat of force." Id. 
against his will, by means offeree or fear " Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301. 
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Finally, the lengthy detention in this case made the crime substantially easier to 
commit. Once defendant had Porter's debit card, he could have obtained the PIN number and 
released Porter. Instead, defendant chose to force Porter to accompany him to the different 
ATM's to ensure that Porter had given him the correct PIN number. By keeping Porter with 
him, defendant also lessened the risk of detection. If defendant had released Porter after 
taking the debit card, Porter could have promptly notified police who might have been able 
to prevent defendant from taking as much money as he did from Porter's account. By 
detaining Porter, defendant ensured that he would be able to clean out Porter's account 
before he could be caught. 
This Court's precedent supports the foregoing analysis. In State v. Lopez, 2001 UT 
App 123, 24 P.3d 993, this Court applied Finlayson's three-part test to hold that an 
aggravated kidnapping conviction did not merge with aggravated assault. There the 
defendant placed the victim in a headlock, dragged her down a flight of stairs and down a 
sidewalk that spanned the length of the apartment building, and then tried to pull her into his 
truck. Id. at | 13. This Court held that Lopez's movement of his victim was "neither 
inconsequential nor incidental to the assault" and that it had "significance independent of the 
aggravated assault." Id. at f 13, 15. Defendant's detention of Porter far exceeded that in 
Lopez, both in time and space. 
Similarly, in Mecham, this Court held that an aggravated kidnapping conviction did 
not merge with an aggravated robbery of a movie theater. There, the defendant and his 
accomplice forced several employees up to the manager's office where they bound the 
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employees and took the day's receipts. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, \ 33. This Court held 
that binding and confining the victims was not inherent in an aggravated robbery; rather, it 
was "an additional act, completely independent of the act of taking property by force or threat 
of force." Id. The Court found support for its conclusion in examples given by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in the Buggs case: 
"A standstill robbery on the street is not a kidnaping: the forced 
removal of the victim to a dark alley for robbery is. The removal of a rape 
victim from room to room within a dwelling solely for the convenience and 
comfort of the rapist is not a kidnapping; the removal from a public place to 
a place of seclusion is. The forced direction of a store clerk to cross the store 
to open a cash register is not a kidnaping; locking him in a cooler to facilitate 
escape is." 
Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, TJ33n.ll (quoting Buggs, 547 P.2d at 731). Again, defendant's 
detention of Porter was at least equal to, if not greater, than the detention in Mecham or in 
the foregoing examples. 
Defendant nevertheless asserts that the facts in Finlayson support his claim that the 
detention in this case was inherent in the robbery. Defendant misreads Finlayson. Finlayson 
lured a woman to his apartment on the pretext of studying Japanese. He then handcuffed, 
raped, and sodomized her. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, ffij 4-5. After the assault, Finlayson made 
the victim cover her head while he drove her home by a circuitous route, taking an hour to 
make a trip that normally required only half an hour. Id. at If 5. Finlayson was convicted of 
rape, forcible sodomy, and aggravated kidnapping. Id. at \ 1. The supreme court held that 
Finlayson's aggravated kidnapping charge merged with his sex crime convictions. Id. at f 
22. 
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Defendant asserts that the basis for Finlayson's holding was that the court found "no 
substantial detention that was independent from that inherent in the rape and sodomy." Br. 
Aplt. 27. Defendant further suggests that Finlayson "expressly rejected" any claim that 
"Finlayson's conduct in making the victim wait while he got dressed, in putting a jacket over 
her head, and in driving her around for more than half an hour longer than was necessary to 
take her home" constituted an independent detention. 
Finlayson did not so hold. Finlayson's kidnapping conviction rested solely on his 
detention of the victim immediately before and during the sexual assault. Id. at \ 22. The 
supreme court held that under Couch, "Finlayson's detention of the victim up to the time of 
the rape and sodomy was incidental to the assault, rather than having an independent 
significance." Id. at ^ f 23 (emphasis added). The supreme court concluded, however, that 
Finlayson's actions after the assault "were of an independent significance separate from the 
commission of sex crimes." Id. at \ 33. "As this detention was against the will of the victim 
for a substantial period of time, the detention appears sufficient to support a conviction for 
simple kidnapping." Id. 
The supreme court refused to sustain a separate kidnapping charge, however, because 
the argument that "defendant's actions following the sexual assault were done with the intent 
to facilitate flight was not presented to the jury." Id. at^J32,n.3. Rather, "the only argument 
the prosecution presented to support the aggravated kidnaping charge was the handcuffing 
of the victim." Id. 
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If the detentions mFinlayson, Mecham, and Lopez had independent significance from 
their host crimes, then the detention in this case certainly does. As stated, defendant detained 
Porter long after he completed the elements of aggravated robbery—he forced him to 
accompany him to the homes of two friends and to three different ATM's and then drove him 
several blocks to the State Fairgrounds where he finally let him go. Trial counsel, therefore, 
was not ineffective in not moving to merge these two crimes. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Zfites of April , 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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'ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (West 2004) (aggravated kidnapping) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301 (West 2004) (kidnapping) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-304 (West 2004) (unlawful detention) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004) (aggravated robbery) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004 (robbery) 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 3 0 2 , Aggravated kidnapping 
(1) An actor commits aggravated kidnapping if the actor, in the course of 
committing unlawful detention or kidnapping: 
(a) possesses, uses, or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in 
Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) acts with intent: 
(i) to hold the victim for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage, or 
to compel a third person to engage in particular conduct or to forbear from 
engaging in particular conduct; 
(ii) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or flight after 
commission or attempted commission of a felony; 
(iii) to hinder or delay the discovery of or reporting of a felony; 
(iv) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim or another; 
(v) to interfere with the performance of any governmental or political 
function; or 
(vi) to commit a sexual offense as described in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 
4, Sexual Offenses. 
(2) As used in this section, "in the course of committing unlawful detention 
or kidnapping" means in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or in 
the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a violation of: 
(a) Section 76-5-301, kidnapping; or 
(b) Section 76-5-304, unlawful detention. 
(3) Aggravated kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by imprison-
ment for an indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 years and which 
may be for life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 
76-3-406. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-302; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 12; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 15; Laws 
1995, c. 337, § 4, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 10, § 5, eff. April 29, 
1996; Laws 1996, c. 40, § 6, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 69, § 2, eff. May 4, 1998; 
Laws 2001, c. 301, § 4, eff. April 30, 2001. 
§ 76-5-301. Kidnapping 
(1) An actor commits kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly, 
without authority of law, and against the will of the victim: 
(a) detains or restrains the victim for any substantial period of time; 
(b) detains or restrains the victim in circumstances exposing the victim to 
risk of bodily injury; 
(c) holds the victim in involuntary servitude; 
(d) detains or restrains a minor without the consent of the minor's parent 
or legal guardian or the consent of a person acting in loco parentis, if the 
minor is 14 years of age or older but younger than 18 years of age; or 
(e) moves the victim any substantial distance or across a state line. 
(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes 
acting without the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of a victim who is 
a mentally incompetent person. 
(3) Kidnapping is a second degree felony. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-301; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 13; Laws 2001, c. 301, § 2, eff. 
April 30, 2001. 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 3 0 4 , Unlawful detention 
(1) An actor commits unlawful detention if the actor intentionally or know-
ingly, without authority of law, and against the will of the victim, detains or 
restrains the victim under circumstances not constituting a violation of: 
(a) kidnapping, Section 76-5-301; 
(b) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1; or 
(c) aggravated kidnapping, Section 76-5-302. 
(2) As used in this section, acting "against the will of the victim" includes 
acting without the consent of the legal guardian or custodian of a victim who is 
a mentally incompetent person. 
(3) Unlawful detention is a class B misdemeanor. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-304; Laws 2001, c. 301, § 5, eff. April 30, 2001. 
§ 76-6-302* Aggravated robbery 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the 
course of committing a robbery' if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-302; Laws 1975, c. 51, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 7; Laws 
1994, c. 271, § 1; Laws 2003, c. 62, § 1, eft May 5, 2003. 
§ 76-6-301. Robbery 
(1) A person commits robbery if: 
(a) the person unlawfully and intentionally takes or attempts to take 
personal property in the possession of another from his person, or immediate 
presence, against his will, by means of force or fear, and with a purpose or 
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal 
property; or 
(b) the person intentionally or knowingly uses force or fear of immediate 
force against another in the course of committing a theft or wrongful 
appropriation. 
(2) An act is considered to be "in the course of committing a theft or 
wrongful appropriation" if it occurs: 
(a) in the course of an attempt to commit theft or wrongful appropriation; 
(b) in the commission of theft or wrongful appropriation; or 
(c) in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission. 
(3) Robbery is a felony of the second degree. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-301; Laws 1995, c. 222, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 2004, c. 
112, § 1, eff. May 3, 2004. 
ADDENDUM B 
Relevant Jury Instructions 
INSTRUCTION NO. l/U 
When you retire to deliberate, you will need to appoint someone to serve as the jury 
foreperson. You will be given a verdict form which the foreperson will fill out and sign on 
behalf of the entire jury. For each charge that has been brought against the defendant, the verdict 
form will have two blanks, one for "guilty" and the other for "not guilty." The foreperson will 
fill in the appropriate blank to reflect the jury's unanimous decision as to each offense. In filling 
out the form the foreperson needs to make sure that only one blank is marked for each charge. 
Because this is a criminal case, every single juror must agree with the verdict. In making 
your decisions you may not draw straws, flip a coin, or decide by majority vote. The jury's 
verdict must represent each jury member's individual, careful, and conscientious judgment 
concerning the defendant's guilt or innocence on each charge. 
INSTRUCTION NO. tb 
Under the law of the State of Utah, a person commits 
Aggravated Kidnapping if that person intentionally or knowingly, 
without authority of law and against the will of the victim, by 
any means and in any manner seizes, confines, detains, or 
transports the victim with intent: 
(a) To hold for ransom or reward, or as a shield or 
hostage, or to compel a third person to engage in particular 
conduct or to forbear from engaging in particular conduct; or 
(b) to facilitate the commission, attempted commission, or 
flight after commission or attempted commission of a felony; or 
(c) to inflict bodily injury on or to terrorize the victim 
or another. 
INSTRUCTION NO. $&* 
You are instructed that use of a financial transaction card 
without the consent of the owner, with the intent to obtain 
money or property in excess of $1000 is a felony. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 3 
You are instructed that theft of over $1000 is a felony. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J?^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Carl Stanley Fleming, 
of the offense of Aggravated Kidnapping as charged in count II 
of the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 7th day of November, 2003, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Carl Stanley 
Fleming, did by any means and in any manner, seize, confine, 
detain, or transport Stephen Porter; and 
2. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or 
transportation was done intentionally or knowingly; and 
3. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or 
transportation was against the will of Stephen Porter, and 
without authority of law; and 
4. That such seizure, confinement, detention, or 
transportation was committed with the intent to facilitate the 
commission, attempted commission, or flight after commission or 
attempted commission of a felony. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping as 
charged in count II of the information. If, on the other hand, 
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or 
more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty of count II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 ^ 
You are instructed that Robbery is a felony. 
ADDENDUM C 
Defense Exhibit 9 
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